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International Vertical Equity
Adam H. Rosenzweig*
This Essay considers the role of equity in the international tax context. While
much has been written about the importance of equity in the domestic context,
the conversation around international tax has failed to recognize the importance
of the concept of equity. While tax policy in the domestic context has historically
prioritized equity over efficiency, tax policy in the international context has not
equally prioritized equity, at least not in the same way. In particular, this Essay
addresses this question by revisiting the classic and dominant theory of equity
in international tax policy, inter-nation equity, and its traditional roots in efficiency models focusing on the concepts of “source” and “residence.” By doing
so, inter-nation equity can indirectly incorporate some of the pro-efficiency biases inherent in those concepts into international tax policy. International vertical equity attempts to remove those biases by reinvigorating the conception of
ability to pay in the international context, much like in the domestic tax context.
While there are still significant hurdles to implementing such a system—most
notably limited data and the competing nationalistic interests to keep wealth
within a country’s own borders—the theory of international vertical equity can
begin to lay the groundwork to establish a more robust and equitable system for
international taxation.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay addresses the question: What does equity mean in the international tax context? Of course, a vast amount has been written on the
role of equity in the international tax literature, primarily on the theory of
so-called “Inter-Nation Equity” which has dominated the debate.1 Yet the
consensus for the most part in that literature has been that equity plays a
much less significant impact on international tax policy than efficiency.
To this end, this Essay will consider two motivating questions: (1) why
has equity not played a stronger role in the development of international
tax policy as compared to domestic tax policy, and (2) is there a new form
of equity analysis that can address this problem to allow for a more robust
role for equity in international tax policy?
This Essay will propose a new metric of “International Vertical Equity” (IVE) as a new international tax equity instrument distinct from the
predominant current theory of inter-nation equity. Rather than attempt to
measure a country’s “fair share” of tax revenue (as most current metrics
do), IVE serves as a measure of each country’s relative fiscal capacity to
fund itself as a sovereign. Unlike inter-nation equity, which analyzes the
equitable nature of a preexisting division of tax base, IVE provides a
measure of something closer to a measure of marginal utility commonly
used for individuals in the international context. In short, IVE provides
the first metric to extrapolate the well-known theory of Vertical Equity in
the domestic tax policy context into the international tax policy context.
In this way, IVE can provide a new metric to help overcome some of the
conceptual and practical roadblocks to equity, serving a robust function
under the existing international tax regime.
I. THE ROLE OF EQUITY IN DOMESTIC TAX POLICY
Tax policy is typically described as comprised of three components,
(1) equity, (2) efficiency, and (3) simplicity, with the goal of tax policy
being to balance these three at times competing goals into a single coherent tax system. Most often, simplicity is the first to be sacrificed, leaving
most tax policy debates to be described in terms of a “tradeoff” between
equity and efficiency.2 The simplest example is the perennial debate over
the proper highest marginal rate of tax on the highest income earners.
1. See infra Section II.A for a discussion of IVE.
2. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 609 (1993) (discussing the system of
“tradeoffs” in an international tax analysis). See generally James R. Repetti, The Appropriate Roles
for Equity and Efficiency in a Progressive Individual Income Tax, 23 FLA. TAX REV. 522 (2020)
(arguing that increased focus on economic efficiency in designing tax policy has come at the
expense of equity and led to a decreased individual income tax rate progressivity, which in turn has
exacerbated inequality).
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Most theories of equity would support imposing higher tax rates on
higher incomes and lower tax rates on lower incomes. By contrast, while
slightly more complex, efficiency supports setting the highest tax rate
somewhere in the middle of the income distribution with very low rates
at the lowest and highest end of the income distribution.3 The existing
U.S. federal income tax in fact blends both policies—with progressive
rates on individuals earning wages and salary and reduced rates on income from capital gains and stock options.4
Equity itself is traditionally further subdivided into “horizontal” equity
and “vertical” equity. In general, horizontal equity refers to the concept
that similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly to avoid arbitrariness in tax liability, while vertical equity refers to the concept that
appropriate distinctions should be made between differently situated taxpayers, i.e., progressivity.5 Traditional vertical equity provides that taxpayers should be ranked by some measure, typically annual income, and
then allocate tax liability higher to those with higher income and lower to
those with lower income.
More recently, vertical equity has come under attack as a useful tool
of tax policy. As one example, a debate has emerged as to whether horizontal and vertical equity have substantively different meaning at all.6
Critics of vertical equity argue that the act of combining similarly situated
taxpayers into groups in effect also separates groups of differently situated taxpayers.7 For example, if all taxpayers with income under $20,000
per year are treated as similarly situated then, at the same time, the other
taxpayers with income above $20,000 must not be considered similarly
situated. If horizontal equity demands the “under $20,000” group pays
the same tax rate, then horizontal equity also demands that everyone in
the “above $20,000” group pays a different rate. Assuming this is true,
vertical equity could be thought of as effectively collapsing into horizontal equity.
Taken together, the goal of tax policy in the classic sense is to raise a
fixed amount of revenue in a manner that best balances these competing
3. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 157, 164 (1990) (discussing low tax rates at each end of income distribution).
4. See generally id.; Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, Optimal Tax Policy When Firms Are
Internationally Mobile, 18 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 580 (2005).
5. David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43,
43 (2006) (“The principle of horizontal equity demands that similarly situated individuals face
similar tax burdens.”).
6. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 2, at 607 (“The starting point was a statement by
Musgrave in 1959 that the requirements of horizontal and vertical equity are but different sides of
the same coin.”).
7. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 2, at 608 (“[I]f we cannot explain why we discriminate
among unequals, then we cannot explain why we fail to discriminate among equals.”).
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demands of equity and efficiency. Numerous examples can be found
throughout the literature, ranging from earned income tax credit,8 marriage penalty,9 capital gains rates,10 home mortgage interest deductions,11
and tax-exempt status.12 Crucially, what is often forgotten when discussing such tax policy issues is that the traditional equity/efficiency analysis
is necessarily being done with respect to individual policies within the
context of an income tax. Put differently, most equity/efficiency tradeoff
analysis implicitly is undertaken in service to the goals of the income tax
and not to the choice of whether to adopt an income tax in the first place.
So if it is not equity/efficiency, what are the fundamental goals of determining the income tax as choice of tax base? While there is no single
universal comprehensive theory, the one common thread throughout the
literature is that (perhaps counterintuitively) no taxing jurisdiction would
adopt a progressive income tax if efficiency were the sole equitable criterion.13
This can be best demonstrated through a simple thought experiment:
What would a tax regime premised solely on efficiency look like? In general, from an efficiency standpoint, the most efficient tax base is the one
that creates the fewest distortions to behavior by taxing the hardest to
change (or least elastic) tax base.14 The most efficient tax base, therefore,
would be some form of a head tax, or a tax of a fixed amount on each
person alive at a given time (such as a tax of $10,000 per person per year
alive on December 31). The reason the head tax is the most efficient is
because there is only one way to avoid paying a tax that must be paid for
being alive—and it is assumed that dying is a pretty extreme way to avoid
paying taxes.15

8. See I.R.C. § 32 (offering a tax credit for working people with low to moderate income).
9. See I.R.C. § 1(a)–(h); see generally Maryalene LaPonsie, What to Know About the Marriage
Tax Penalty, U.S. NEWS: MONEY (Feb. 20, 2020), https://money.usnews.com/money/personalfinance/articles/what-to-know-about-the-marriage-tax-penalty
[https://perma.cc/W545-B2KX]
(explaining how dual-income couples who get married may end up paying more tax than if they
had remained single).
10. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (providing reduced tax rates for gains from certain capital assets held for
longer than a year).
11. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2016) amended by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97,
§ 11043(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2086 (providing a deduction for homeowners for the interest they pay
on any loan used to build, purchase, or make improvements upon their residence).
12. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)–(4) (exempting charitable, religious, educational organizations
and certain social welfare organizations).
13. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Taxation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 647, 652 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007).
14. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, The Economics of Tax Law, in 3 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 106 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2014); see also David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999).
15. See Shaviro supra note 14, at 107.
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On its face, the single largest and most obvious problem with a head
tax is that it doesn’t distinguish between taxpayers based on wealth or
income or any other attribute other than being alive16—millionaires are
taxed the same as minimum wage earners, practicing lawyers are taxed
the same as law students, even a parent is taxed the same as her infant
child. For example, under a head tax of $10,000 per person, a married
couple with two children, with one spouse being a market wage earner
with a salary of roughly $25,000 per year and the other providing fulltime childcare with an imputed value of about $50,000 per year, would
owe $40,000 in taxes, while a single billionaire earning $10 million in the
same year would owe $10,000.
In an economic model the head tax is an “ideal” tax because it optimizes efficiency while raising necessary revenue.17 In the real world,
however, taxing jurisdictions have uniformly rejected head taxes precisely due to equity considerations. If anything, progressive income taxes
have dominated tax policy. Modern progressive income tax regimes are
premised on the so-called Ability to Pay theory, which provides that a
taxpayer’s tax liability should be set as a percentage of that taxpayer’s
income based on how much that taxpayer can afford to contribute, such
that the percentage increases for those with higher incomes. Ability to
Pay is based on a theory known as “declining marginal utility of money”
which provides that utility from income is highest at low-income levels
and declines as incomes increase. In other words, the first dollar earned
by a person used for necessities like food and shelter is more valuable to
that person in terms of “utility” than the one millionth dollar, which might
be spent on luxuries or saved for the future. In turn, Ability to Pay theory
provides that marginal rates should increase as incomes increase; for example, a taxpayer earning $10,000 a month might pay 25% in taxes while
one making $2,000 a month might only pay 5% in taxes.
As can be seen from this overview of tax policy, the building blocks
of an income tax are not necessarily weighted equally—efficiency would
support something like a head tax or endowments tax while equity would
support something like a progressive income tax or wealth tax. In the real
world, every major developed country has adopted some form of progressive income tax (at least in combination with other taxes). 18 While it

16. See id. (“Substantial reliance on constant per capita levies is unacceptable precisely because
of distributive concerns.”).
17. See Slemrod, supra note 3, at 159.
18. See generally EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
1 (2d ed.1909) (noting progressive income tax systems across continental Europe, Japan, America,
Australia, Canada, and elsewhere).
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doesn’t necessarily explain why, this fact is consistent with the conclusion that equity won out over efficiency as the guiding normative principle for choice of tax system and tax base.
II. THE ROLE OF EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
Given the dominance of equity over efficiency in the development of
the modern income tax, at least in the choice of tax base context, it might
surprise many that in the international tax context efficiency has tended
to dominate tax policy debates.19 Even more surprisingly, perhaps, this
appears to have become the case without much investigation. Rather, for
the most part the literature appears to assume that efficiency is the superior policy-making metric. While recent scholarship has begun to question this conclusion, either by advocating for a stronger role of equity or
newer more robust theories of equity,20 for the most part they have not
challenged the dominant role efficiency has played in the first place.21
From its beginnings in the early twentieth century, international tax
policy was analyzed in terms of the well-known theories of “capital export neutrality” (CEN) and “capital import neutrality” (CIN). The basic
premise underlying these “neutrality” theories is that the tax law should
minimize distortions to the cross-border business decisions of taxpayers.
For example, CEN provides that if a taxpayer operating solely in the
United States pays 30% U.S. income tax, then that taxpayer should also
pay 30% in U.S. income tax if operating in both the United States and in
other countries. Since the total tax liability is the same, the tax should not
distort business choice whether to operate in the United States or in other
countries. This is sometimes referred to as “worldwide” taxation, in that
tax must be imposed on both domestic and foreign income to achieve this
goal. By contrast, CIN provides that a U.S. business operating in a foreign
country should pay the same local rate of tax as other companies doing
business there. This is also referred to as “territorial” taxation because it

19. See Kim Brooks, Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an Important but
Underappreciated International Tax Policy Objective, in TAX REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A
VOLUME IN MEMORY OF RICHARD MUSGRAVE 471, 492 (John G. Head & Richard Krever eds.,
2009) [hereinafter Brooks, Inter-Nation Equity] (“[W]hy has inter-nation equity been undervalued
or under-utilized in [international] tax policy . . . ?”).
20. See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 145 (1998) (describing individuals who have proposed a more equity-driven
international tax framework).
21. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay
Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 302–03 (2001) (examining the role that
fairness concerns, embedded in the ability-to-pay-concept, play in justifying the U.S. policy of
taxing U.S. residents on their worldwide incomes).
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is implemented by exempting the foreign income of business from domestic tax. The law is “neutral” in that domestic companies are not put at
a competitive disadvantage with local businesses in the foreign market.
Ability to Pay theory, as discussed above, provides that tax rates
should increase progressively as income rises due to the declining marginal utility of money. Ability to Pay looks to ability to consume, meaning that as income goes up, taxpayers can afford to pay more tax and still
have enough income to meet their consumption needs (or, put differently,
their lost consumption results in lower loss of utility than other taxpayers). Since all that matters is ability consume, it follows that the source of
income (whether domestic or foreign) is irrelevant. After all, money is
money whether it’s earned in the United States or China and whether it’s
paid in U.S. dollars or yuan. Since taxpayers can use any of it to consume
goods and services, it all should be taken into account under Ability to
Pay.
For most of U.S. history there was not much conflict, at least deep
conflict, between the policies supported by CEN and those under Ability
to Pay in actual tax policy. From 1919 through 2017, the United States
international tax system was based primarily on some form of worldwide
system. Over the past couple of decades, however, a movement developed to support shifting from a worldwide system to a territorial system,
the policy supported by CIN. Economists and legal scholars vigorously
debated whether CEN, CIN, or some other neutrality metric should serve
as the basis for international tax policy in the modern economy. 22 While
the literature was sharply divided, a growing but far from unanimous consensus began to emerge that as the worldwide economy grew increasingly
global, CIN became the more appropriate base.
By comparison, however, Ability to Pay does not suffer from such uncertainty. Ability to Pay theory supports a worldwide income tax. There
simply is no way under a robust and clearly defined theory of Ability to
Pay to conclude that two U.S. taxpayers earning the same total income
should pay two different amounts of tax solely because they operate in
different countries. This is not a secret: it was vociferously argued in the
literature throughout the debate.23
Even with efficiency conflicted about the proper tax base and equity
strongly supporting worldwide tax, the United States joined most of the
rest of the countries of the world in 2017 by repealing its worldwide tax
22. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021 (1997); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
923, 996 (2010) (advocating for the harmonization of international tax laws to reduce the incentive
for poorer countries to become tax havens).
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regime and replacing it with a territorial tax system for multinational
businesses based in the United States.24 From a political standpoint, the
argument that worldwide taxation put U.S. business at a significant disadvantage to its competitors based in Europe or China in the global marketplace seemed to win the day. Under this argument, U.S. businesses
would be forced to lose market share, lay off workers, or even go out of
business due to this competitive disadvantage.
By contrast, Ability to Pay did not seem to influence the political debate to any significant extent, notwithstanding that it serves as the primary normative basis for the U.S. income tax system as a whole.25 To
draw an analogy, imagine a political candidate proposes completely repealing income tax on millionaires as a way to stimulate economic
growth. The common response, and one often raised in political debates,
would be that the proposal is an unfair giveaway to the rich at the expense
of the middle class and working poor.26 Even if unspoken, it seems that
Ability to Pay principles underlie such critiques, at least as a political
matter. To be clear, this is not to say that tax cuts could not or should not
be adopted depending on the circumstances, but rather that Ability to Pay
theory has proven a persistent and powerful counterweight to such proposals ever since the adoption of the modern income tax.
Why the huge disparity in the role equity plays in domestic tax policy
versus international tax policy? As an initial matter, the concept of equity
in the domestic context appeals more directly to familiar and intuitive
notions of political and moral conceptions of fairness than in the international context. For example, it may not be hard to understand why a head
tax in the United States that imposes the same tax liability on a single
parent working for minimum wage as it does on wealthy individuals such
as Mark Zuckerberg (the founder and CEO of Facebook)27 might be considered unfair on its face, but it can be more difficult to understand intuitively whether a worldwide tax regime with foreign tax credits might be
more or less fair than a territorial tax regime with a global intangibles
minimum tax.

24. See generally, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054; J. Clifton
Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Expanded Worldwide Versus Territorial Taxation
After the TCJA, 161 TAX NOTES 1173 (2018).
25. See Fleming, Jr. et al., supra note 21, at 345.
26. See, e.g., Dave Gilson, How Trump Turned Tax Day into a Giveaway for the 1 Percent,
MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/04/how-trumpturned-tax-day-into-a-giveaway-for-the-1-percent/ [https://perma.cc/V7KJ-NFK2].
27. Mark
Zuckerberg,
FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/profile/mark-zuckerberg/
[https://perma.cc/D3CV-G6Y5] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021) (tracking CEO of Facebook Mark
Zuckerberg’s real time net worth—currently nearly $100 billion—as well as other biographical
information).
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By contrast, traditional neutrality theories such as CEN and CIN have
begun to come into question in the international tax literature from many
different sides. Interestingly, CEN and CIN first came into question from
an efficiency standpoint. For example, recently a competing theory of
“capital ownership neutrality” (CON) was introduced, which, as its name
indicates, focuses on the ownership of capital as opposed to CEN and
CIN which focus on incentives to import or export capital.28 Even further,
a recent strand of the literature has started to question the concept of neutrality in the field of international taxation altogether.29 This line of literature contends that, rather than serving as purely objective baselines, the
outcomes of neutrality theory depend almost entirely on which margin is
being analyzed. The problem is that efficiency theory does not necessarily provide a reason to favor one particular margin over another. In
other words, neutrality theory can tell us how to maximize on a margin,
but it provides little guidance on which margin to use. Yet that is precisely
what it had been used for throughout most of the development of international tax policy.30
Despite this emerging consensus that efficiency cannot serve as the
lodestar for international tax policy, somewhat surprisingly other tax policy metrics have not readily stepped up to take its place.31 It is difficult
to understand precisely why this is the case. It may be due, in part, to a
misunderstanding of equity in the international context; it may be in part
due to the lack of a single clear equity criterion in the international context; perhaps it is due to the lack of easily and readily available metrics
to measure equitable disparities.32 Regardless which one may turn out to
be true, what matters more is that all of them are more in the nature of
symptoms than causes; symptoms of a subtle but pervasive structural bias
in favor of efficiency over equity in international tax policy.
An example can help flesh this out. Recall the example above where
one political candidate proposes a zero tax rate on millionaires. The familiar and immediate response, rooted in Ability to Pay, was an inherent

28. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L
TAX J. 487, 496 (2003) (stating that tax systems satisfy capital ownership neutrality if they do not
distort ownership patterns).
29. See generally Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L.
REV. 99 (2011).
30. It is partially for this reason that some have begun to reject using the so-called alphabet soup
of CEN, CIN, CON, finding them to be more confusing than helpful in setting international tax
policy. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 14 (2014).
31. Nancy H. Kaufman, Equity Considerations in International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1465, 1465 (2000) [hereinafter Kaufman, Equity Considerations] (claiming that issues of
fairness, which are inherently about values, play second fiddle to some other considerations).
32. See Brooks, Inter-Nation Equity, supra note 19, at 492 (explaining that the concept of equity
has been considered too vague to provide sufficient guidance on particular international tax issues).
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unfairness in such a proposal. Now assume that the proposal is to reduce
the tax rate on income earned from sales of goods and services by U.S.
taxpayers in China to zero. The potential responses become more complicated. One might be that the proposal is unfair to U.S. taxpayers who
do not operate in China, but another might be that the proposal helps U.S.
businesses compete or expand in the Chinese market, or another could be
to prevent Chinese companies from taking over certain industries like social networking or biotechnology.
As this example shows, claims of equity in the international context
raise more complex and potentially conflicting positions. Without a more
precise way to identify and quantify equitable tradeoffs, any claim to equity in the international context can appear purely subjective or self-serving and thus be subject to misplaced attacks which in the domestic tax
policy context would seem unacceptable on their face.
Perhaps the starkest example of this can be seen in the context of proposals to transfer tax revenue from wealthier to poorer or developing
countries as a means to increase development. For example, one of the
original tools advocated to help developing countries was a provision
called “tax sparing” in tax treaties. In short, tax sparing would permit developing countries to use low tax rates as a way to attract capital investment without developed countries undoing it through higher taxes.33 Tax
sparing was adopted in many bilateral tax treaties but was strongly opposed by the United States, mostly on an efficiency basis.34 Even worse,
the data started to show over time that tax sparing did not in fact help
developing countries as much as had been hoped and expected. Eventually, tax sparing fell out of favor as a tool for equity in international tax
policy.35
Over the years, other tools were proposed to replace tax sparing, but
none gained much support.36 Instead, a new criticism slowly began to
develop that not only were these proposals ineffective but that they were
33. See William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Sparing,
and Development: It Is All About Source, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 349, 361 (2008) (“[T]he object is to
permit developing economies to reduce their income taxes under an incentive scheme for foreign
taxpayers without having the residence country collect the spared tax.”).
34. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in LowIncome Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN'S L.J. 505, 518–19 (2009)
[hereinafter Brooks, Tax Sparing] (offering the arguments that led to the failed 1957 U.S.–Pakistan
tax sparing treaty as an example of American resistance to tax sparing).
35. See James R. Hines Jr., “Tax Sparing” and Direct Investment in Developing Countries, in
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 39, 70 (2000) (describing issues
with “tax sparing” that have caused its value to decline in relation to equity in international tax
policy).
36. See Brooks, Tax Sparing, supra note 34, at 558 (explaining that high income countries
should look for ways to prevent tax competition among low-income countries instead of agreeing
to tax sparing).
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also bad policy in that they reward and thus incentivize developing countries to use their tax systems to undermine (or steal) U.S. and international
tax base away from where it properly belonged. As an example, one commentator stated that “[Supporters] argue that tax havens cannot be beat
except by being bought off under the current tax system. One wonders
how buying off all the possible tax havens would be possible when each
has insatiable demands.”37
These arguments appear to mirror many arguments made in the domestic context, such as the debate over the earned income tax credit
(EITC). In general, opponents argue that giving money through the tax
system to the working poor in the United States does nothing but incentivize people to remain poor enough so as not to lose that benefit. In effect, efficiency theory would say that the EITC, while better than other
programs, is undesirable because it effectively locks people into a level
of poverty indefinitely.38
While these arguments share a basic premise, it is important to note the
stark difference in tone and impact between the domestic and international context. With few distinctions, the efficiency analysis proves winning in the tax sparing debate but unpersuasive in the EITC context. Why
do similar equity arguments prove so persuasive in one context and not
the other?
To demonstrate this more starkly, reimagine the above quote modified
to apply in the domestic context, as follows: “[Supporters] argue that
[poor and starving people] cannot be beat except by being bought off under the current tax system. One wonders how buying off all the [poor and
starving people] would be possible when each has insatiable demands.”
The incentive-based argument effectively remains the same, but the equity analysis seems to feel different and much less appealing. In the domestic context, not only has the EITC survived such critiques, but it has
thrived, becoming one of the largest anti-poverty programs in the entire
federal government.39 Why the stark difference?
Of course, the two situations are not identical, and in no way is this
example meant to equate developing countries with domestic families living in poverty or to attribute such a position to the quote’s author. Rather,
the point of the thought experiment is to demonstrate just how starkly

37. Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing GE and Other Masters of the Universe, 132 TAX NOTES 175,
180 (2011).
38. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal
Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 462–63 (1997) (explaining that EITC is undesirable from
an efficiency perspective as such a program will disincentivize gaining high-income employment).
39. See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (2007).
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different the application of equity in the domestic context can sound compared to the international context. While rarely discussed, this disparity
seems deeply entrenched in the literature. If there is even a chance that
this disparity does not reflect an affirmative policy choice but rather
something like path dependence or upon reflection proves anachronistic,
there would be less reason to remain committed to it. The remainder of
this section will discuss the development of equity theory in the international tax context.
A. Inter-Nation Equity
The first, and by far the most dominant, theory of equity in international tax is the theory of inter-nation equity. The concept of international
equity begins by looking to the baseline concept of “national gain” and
then determining whether departures from this baseline are fair or unfair.
To quote the original 1972 essay:
Let X, a resident of A, invest in B. Income earned thereon constitutes a
national ‘gain’ to country A. If country B taxes the income earned by
X, the gain accruing to country A as a nation is reduced. This is the
issue of inter-nation equity. The fact that the gain accrues to B’s treasury is not the crucial point. B may pass this gain on to its tax-payers by
tax reduction, but it still retains the national gain. Similarly, A has suffered a national loss due to B’s tax. This national loss results, whether
A gives a credit to X for taxes paid to B, thereby suffering a treasury
loss, or whether the income is taxed again and X is left to bear the burden.40

As a second step, inter-nation equity then allows for departures from
the baseline distribution of tax base attributable to national gain to account for factors such as disparities in labor and capital, natural resources,
and other attributes of different countries. Crucially, however, international equity places the burden for departures from national gain on proponents of these departures. In essence, inter-nation equity creates a presumption in favor of national gain and against redistribution of tax base.
Over time, this presumption has proven particularly difficult to overcome.
As explained in more detail below, while inter-nation equity was intended to incorporate equitable principles into international tax policy, it
did not start from equitable first principles, whether theories of sovereignty, egalitarianism, democratic legitimacy, or others. Rather, it was
developed from the same initial model as the international tax efficiency

40. Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Inter-Nation Equity, in MODERN FISCAL
ISSUES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 63, 67 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head eds., 1972).
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analysis.41 To isolate the issue of efficiency in international tax that
model was designed using two countries and one item of income, with
one being the country of source and the other the country of residence.42
This makes sense for an efficiency model because there is no issue of
international tax unless at least two countries are competing over taxing
an item of income. From this perspective, it is irrelevant which country
is labeled source and which is labeled residence, or whether they are different in terms of wealth or standard of living, since all that matters is that
two countries exist in the model.
By contrast, the point of inter-nation equity is precisely to take into
account differences between countries, which it does by assigning different measures of wealth or development between the countries of source
and residence. Yet, building an equity analysis with the same conceptual
framework and model as efficiency unintentionally but effectively incorporated a pro-efficiency bias into the analysis. To draw an analogy, it is
much like home-court advantage in sports. Since equity is playing against
efficiency on efficiency’s “turf” and using efficiency’s “equipment,” it
starts at an inherent disadvantage. Or using a different analogy, it is as if
equity opted to cede the opening move in perpetuity to efficiency in a
global game of chess.43 By doing so, in the long run the advantage effectively dominates the outcome over almost any other factor.
Contrast this to vertical equity in the domestic income tax context,
which typically starts its analysis by looking at individuals as taxpayers
where the only tool to differentiate among taxpayers is income.44 Unfortunately income is a very poor proxy for many if not most underlying
traits one might want to take into account in an equity analysis. Being
rich doesn’t make one good; being poor doesn’t make one bad. Unskilled
taxpayers born to wealthy parents may earn high incomes while highly
skilled lawyers may choose to work for low-paying public interest jobs.
Even for the same taxpayer, one year the taxpayer may appear rich due
to a large bonus and the next year may appear poor due to retirement.
Since income is the only proxy available, however, some standard by
which to compare taxpayers based on income is necessary. This is where
declining marginal utility comes in. This theory provides that higher income taxpayers can disproportionately afford to pay higher taxes than
lower income taxpayers. Using declining marginal utility as the metric,

41. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination, in THE NEW
PUBLIC FINANCE 167, 189 (Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceiçāo eds., 2006).
42. See Brooks, Inter-Nation Equity, supra note 19, at 486.
43. BRUCE PANDOLFINI, CHESS THINKING: THE VISUAL DICTIONARY OF CHESS MOVES,
RULES, STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS 108 (1995) (defining first move advantage).
44. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 2, at 613.
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vertical equity can provide a policy outcome of progressive rates as incomes increase. By defining equity on its own terms in this manner, equity can stand on equal footing with efficiency in domestic tax policy.
B. Interindividual Equity
Inter-nation equity defined in this manner can be contrasted to interindividual equity. In short, inter-nation equity uses the nation as the relevant unit in international tax while interindividual equity looks to individual people as the relevant unit. Interindividual equity disregards
countries on the premise that ultimately equity cares about the well-being
of people and thus must ultimately focus on individuals. For this reason,
much like in the domestic context, the foundational theory of interindividual fairness is Ability to Pay. Recall that from a normative theory
standpoint, Ability to Pay incorporates the concept of vertical equity such
that the tax law should take into account relative differences in income in
assessing overall tax liability. Some advocates of interindividual equity
have argued that the same criterion should apply in the international context.45 The basis of their argument is relatively straightforward: since
Ability to Pay underlies the domestic international tax system there is no
reason it should stop applying at a country’s borders. For this reason, interindividual equity typically supports worldwide taxation of income.
Ability to Pay is not the only interindividual form of equity in the international tax context, however. More recent scholars have argued that
issues of global distributive justice are more relevant in the international
tax context as opposed to the domestic context.46 From this perspective,
the normative goal of an international tax regime should be less focused
on taxpayers’ relative ability to pay and more on redistributing wealth
and income from the wealthiest taxpayers to the poorest potential taxpayers. In this respect, the distributive justice analysis of interindividual equity would support not only worldwide taxation with progressive rates
but also explicit redistribution of tax revenue from wealthier to poorer
countries in the international tax context.47
A more recent variation on this line of literature has focused less on
comparative wealth or income of individuals and more on fair taxation as
a human right.48 In short, this theory treats taxation as an obligation of a
45. See Kaufman, Equity Considerations, supra note 31, at 1467.
46. See Tsilly Dagan, International Tax and Global Justice, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1,
6–7 (2017) (arguing that principles of distributive justice should be applied universally: to all
human beings across the globe).
47. Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking International Distributive Justice: Fairness as Insurance, 31
B.U. INT’L L.J. 267, 272–73 (2013).
48. Allison Christians, Fair Taxation as a Basic Human Right, 9 INT’L REV.
CONSTITUTIONALISM 211, 212 (2009).
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state to its people in the same manner as the rights to life or liberty, among
others. From this perspective, a country imposing a system of taxation in
which the wealthiest pay no tax and the poorest bear a high tax burden
would violate human rights in the same manner as if that country denied
poorer people the right to vote. By tying taxation to human rights, the
equity analysis by definition takes priority over all else, including efficiency. Further, the right would be inalienable and cross all borders, governments, and economic systems.49
C. Sovereignty, Trade, and Other Theories
A recent strand in the literature has rejected a strict dichotomy of internation and interindividual equity and has looked to other normative baselines to serve as the basis of equitable theory in international tax. For example, one strand of literature has argued that the proper focus of tax
policy should not be on division of tax base per se but rather on the impact
that the tax laws of one country have on the tax revenue of another country.50 From this perspective, equitable considerations do not involve individuals but rather sovereigns. As sovereigns, countries have both the
right to use taxes to raise revenue but also the duty not to interfere with
the national tax regimes of each other.51 While similar in that it looks to
the state as the relevant unit, it is not technically considered part of internation equity because rather than looking to national gain, this line of
literature looks first to sovereign obligations states owe each other in the
international regime.52
From this perspective, for example, increasingly aggressive “antiabuse” efforts by large wealthy countries such as the United States that
reach into the activities of other countries could be considered to violate
this norm.53 In particular, efforts by the United States to coerce other
countries into sharing information about bank deposits or other capital
transfers in and out of their countries as a means to collect taxes against
U.S. taxpayers would be seen as a violation of this norm by intruding on
the sovereignty of the other countries.54

49. Anthony C. Infanti, Internation Equity and Human Development, in TAX LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 209, 235–36 (Miranda Stewart & Yariv Brauner eds., 2013).
50. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L
L. 99, 147 (2009).
51. See id. at 140 (explaining that equitable considerations involve sovereigns).
52. Diane Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in
Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555, 572 (2009).
53. Peter Dietsch, Rethinking Sovereignty in International Fiscal Policy, 37 REV. INT’L
STUDIES 2107, 2107–09 (2011).
54. Id. at 2107.
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Under traditional inter-nation equity analysis, small countries that use
their tax laws to attract capital investment or tax base away from other
countries were often labeled as “tax havens” or “bad actors” for trying to
shift national gain inappropriately. For this reason, these countries were
deemed appropriate targets for punishment both by individual countries
and international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).55 By contrast, the sovereignty
literature often takes the opposite point of view, treating the actions of
these larger wealthier countries as intrusions into the fiscal sovereignty
of the smaller countries.56
Similarly, another line of literature has argued that countries that disproportionately benefit from the international economic system owe an
obligation to transfer revenue to the countries that do not benefit as much
from the tax system.57 In other words, if a country such as the United
States derives over half of the worldwide gains from trade due to the
World Trade Organization, then it has an affirmative obligation to transfer some of that gain to poorer countries in the form of tax base. In effect,
this line of literature challenges the normative position that national gain
is a neutral starting point for a tax equity analysis and thus should not
serve as the starting point for an equity analysis.58
III. INTERNATIONAL VERTICAL EQUITY
As the above discussion demonstrates, all existing theories of international tax equity (even competing ones) built on the theoretical foundation of inter-nation equity incorporate the same underlying premises
about the baseline distribution of worldwide tax base as inter-nation equity does, which are the same as those underlying the capital neutrality
model. In turn, to the extent those premises incorporate a bias in favor of
any one policy over another, those models would all be expected to reflect
that bias to some extent. If true, the superiority of efficiency over equity
in international tax could simply reflect this common bias rather than actual policy superiority. In such a case, what would be needed is a new
model of equity explicitly not built on those same foundations. This part
will propose one such new model—International Vertical Equity (IVE)—

55. Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s
Campaign Against “Harmful Tax Competition”, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 33 (2012).
56. Laurens van Apeldoorn, BEPS, Tax Sovereignty and Global Justice, 21 CRITICAL REV.
INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 478, 491–92 (2016).
57. Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International
Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2010).
58. Ilan Benshalom, How to Redistribute? A Critical Examination of Mechanisms to Promote
Global Wealth Redistribution, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 317, 336 (2014).

2021]

International Vertical Equity

487

and a new analytic metric—the IVE Score—that can be used to simply
and clearly apply IVE to the real world.
A. Baselines, Bias, and International Tax
As discussed above, since most theories of international tax share a
conceptual baseline of “source” and “residence” they all would be distorted to the extent those concepts implicitly carried some bias. This can
be difficult to see, however, especially with few alternatives to act as a
comparison. As the first and dominant theory of international tax equity,
however, inter-nation equity provides the best possible example to try to
unearth of this phenomenon.
Inter-nation equity analysis relies on the concept of “national gain,”
which in turn is built on the same initial allocation of resources and income between countries of source and residence as the capital efficiency
model. From this perspective, it should not be surprising that inter-nation
equity ends up supporting similar allocations of tax base as the capital
neutrality model. This makes sense; after all, if one starts with the premise
that income or gain “properly” belongs to a country as an initial matter it
would be difficult for any countervailing policy to depart from that allocation. By framing inter-nation equity in terms of national gain, it is almost predetermined to support that allocation, which in turn means that
any other equity considerations are doomed to fail as a normative goal in
the international tax context.59
This problem becomes even more apparent when transitioning from
the concept of national gain in theory to national gain in the real world.
Most traditional economic models of international tax assume two countries, a country of residence and a country of source, so as to isolate the
issue of cross-border taxation. It follows that national gain in the same
model would also be defined in terms of an assumed country of residence
and country of source. In the real world, multinational business transactions are more complex. Many countries define “source” and “residence”
quite differently for their own tax purposes.60 Thus, rather than serve as
a neutral baseline, in the real world source and residence are inherently
legal concepts enacted for the purpose of implementing and enforcing an
international tax system.61
The literature generally concedes that economics theory alone cannot
provide a definition of country of “source” or country of “residence” precisely because these concepts have no independent normative economic

59. Brooks, Inter-Nation Equity, supra note 19, at 474.
60. Wei Cui, Minimalism About Residence and Source, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 245, 246 (2017).
61. Id. at 247.
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meaning.62 For example, if one were to buy a soda pop at a convenience
store in the United States and offers to pay with a real dollar bill, the store
doesn’t ask first where the dollar came from. A dollar is a dollar; there is
no economic difference between a dollar earned in New York, or a dollar
earned in California, or a dollar earned in Chicago, or a dollar earned in
London, or a dollar earned in Shanghai. Unlike gross domestic product
(GDP),63 income is not a measure of wealth or activity. Rather, income
is a measure of increases in wealth.64 By contrast, source and residence
are concepts linked to economic activity, determined primarily by looking to underlying factors such as location of sales, location of production,
location of payor, location of research and development, or other factors.65 Which countries are defined as the source or residence therefore
depends on which factors are chosen.
For example, assume Apple sells an iPhone for a total profit of $300.
Apple is headquartered in the United States, and the design and marketing
of the phone were done in the United States. The patents are owned by
an Irish subsidiary. The trademarks are owned by a Dutch subsidiary. The
phone was built in China and was sold in France. Assume Apple earns
$300 on the sale of the phone. Where is the source of the income? France,
the country of sale? China, the country where it was built? The United
States, the headquarters and country of design? Any of these can be justified by at least part of the economic activity generating the profit. Correspondingly it proves difficult to convince competing countries to adopt
any factor that is to their own detriment. From this perspective it should
not be surprising that countries such as India and China prefer populationrelated factors while countries such as the United States prefer consumption-based factors.
With the primacy of source and residence declining, theories of neutrality and efficiency built on source and residence have also come under
challenge. In its place, for the most part, the broader political and policy
debate in recent years has shifted to defining a country’s fair share of

62. Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality: Revisited, 64 TAX L. REV. 131, 132 (2010).
63. See infra Section III.C.
64. See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay et al., The David R. Tillinghast Lecture “What’s Source Got to
Do with It?” Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 137 (2002) (“The
idealized Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income as equaling consumption, plus, or minus, the
change in the taxpayer’s wealth between the beginning and the end of a year.”). More specifically,
so-called Haig-Simons income is a measure of consumption plus savings over any given period of
time. See also Boris I. Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1032, 1036 (1968).
65. Fred B. Brown, An Equity-Based, Multilateral Approach for Sourcing Income Among
Nations, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 565, 570–75 (2011).
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taxes or taxing where value is added.66 Either way, what is considered
fair is often defined in relative terms to some baseline, typically with little
to no further investigation into whether that baseline itself meets any independent normative metrics. Put differently, to show that tax liability or
revenue is different from an existing baseline does nothing to establish it
is good or bad, only that it is different.
From an inductive reasoning standpoint this approach makes sense. If
specific examples of problems with the existing international tax regime
can be identified, then doing so and providing solutions to the problem
not only makes sense but is extremely valuable to the development of the
tax law. But this approach does nothing to help confront the issue from a
deductive reasoning standpoint. In other words, without some sense of
what normative baseline the international tax regime should strive for, it
is difficult to develop a set of rules to do so. The first step is to understand
what is normatively troubling in the first place before specific solutions
can be developed.
So what precisely is bad about the Apple example from a first principles standpoint? One of the leading critics has phrased it that
income derived by a multinational group from business activities in a
country other than the domicile (however defined) of the group’s ultimate parent company, but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction
that is not the location of the customers or the factors of production
through which the income was derived, and is not the domicile of the
group’s parent company.67

Of note, the definition begins with an assumption that the country of domicile of the parent corporation is the proper country to tax the income of
that group, and then considers income not in that jurisdiction or certain
other jurisdictions as abusive or troubling.68
Implicit in this assumption, however, must be some underlying normative premise that if tax had been imposed by the country of domicile that
would be acceptable or at least less troubling. Yet since this underlying
premise rarely is explicitly stated and even more rarely explicitly defended, it can be difficult to identify. Instead, it can become so accepted
as a premise as to “go without saying” even if it might be influencing the
ultimate outcome. In essence, taxation by the country of “residence” (and

66. See, e.g., Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, Taxing Income Where Value Is
Created, 22 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2018); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Defining a Country's “Fair Share”
of Taxes, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 374–75 (2015) [hereinafter Rosenzweig, “Fair Share” of
Taxes].
67. Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 701–02 (2011).
68. Presumably what underlies these concerns is a sense that the normative underpinnings of
their preferred income tax regime are being undermined in some manner but precisely how is less
clear. See Rosenzweig, “Fair Share” of Taxes, supra note 66, at 387.
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to a lesser extent the country of “source”) could be thought of as becoming so accepted as the unstated “neutral” baseline that even mentioning it
can be seen as unusual or inappropriate. This is not meant as a criticism
of any individual author or individual theory; rather this is a systemic
claim that requires a systemic reappraisal. As the critical tax literature has
demonstrated across several areas, it is precisely when bias becomes so
embedded as to be invisible when it becomes most important to unearth
it and revisit those premises.69
It could be argued that much of the frustration with the lack of success
for equity in the international tax context arises from the fact that it relies
on source and residence which themselves are biased in favor of efficiency because they come from an efficiency-driven model of international tax. If true, it may simply not be possible to separate the instrumentally useful concepts of source and residence from the normative concepts
of source and residence which build into themselves implicit assumptions
about distributional baselines that favor wealthier, developed countries.
In turn, any equity analysis that does use source and residence as baselines would also incorporate this bias, even if unintentionally.
Approached from this perspective, the challenge is to define one’s normative theory of fairness in the international tax regime without relying
on concepts of source and residence. The difficulty is that, absent the
mooring of source and residence, any theory that happens to be coextensive with one’s strategic self-interests would not add any independent
normative content. In other words, any proposed normative framework
that also perfectly matches one’s strategic self-interest would immediately be suspect as being insincere and self-serving. As a result, it should
not be surprising that such theories also prove less than persuasive in generating consensus as might have been initially hoped.
From this perspective, the legal terms of source and residence, while
important if not crucial from an instrumental standpoint, not only do not
help but could affirmatively hurt theories of tax equity in which they are
incorporated. Returning to inter-nation equity, this would mean that it
should not use source and residence to define national gain, yet that is
precisely what the literature has done over the past decades. By doing so,
inter-nation equity, as the dominant normative framework in the international tax literature, has proven less of a counterbalance to efficiency but
ultimately a means to reinforce it. To be clear, this is not to say inter69. See generally CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J.
Crawford eds., 2009). More radically, if conceptions of source and residence lack independent
normative content, existing theories of equity in international tax could be thought to go as far as
not only reflecting but also constructing the bias that favors distribution of international tax base
toward wealthier, developed countries and away from poorer, developing countries. Cf. LIAM
MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 13–15 (2002).
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nation equity cannot have independent normative content, but rather that
theories of inter-nation equity built on source and residence depend entirely on definitions of source and residence that themselves could implicitly favor one outcome over another.
B. Vertical Equity and International Tax
To begin to create a new definition of equity for international tax, at a
minimum that theory must begin with the premise that the fact that a particular item of tax base is allocated to a particular country under source
and residence rules is irrelevant to whether that country should be entitled
to tax that item of income. Rather, source and residence rules would be
treated only as instrumental legal rules used to implement and divide international tax base among countries and not as an exogenous neutral
baseline. Assuming this to be true, some other metric would be needed to
guide the equitable division of tax base.
To determine what this underlying metric should be in the international
context, it helps to look to the more familiar and well-established concept
of vertical equity. As discussed above, vertical equity provides that the
tax law should make appropriate distinctions among taxpayers who are
not similarly situated. For the most part, vertical equity analysis in an
income tax uses income to distinguish among taxpayers. While this is a
simplifying assumption, it provides the clearest and most tractable way
to implement vertical equity analysis. From this perspective, as taxpayers
move up the income scale, they are considered better able to pay taxes
and thus should pay higher rates of tax. In the domestic context this results in an income tax with progressive rate tables such as those used in
the United States.70
In the international context, however, implementing vertical equity
proves more complex. First, the relevant tax unit needs to be defined.
While the unit can be the individual, as in the domestic context, in the
international context the relevant unit could also be the country. Second,
the choice of unit impacts the measure of income. In the United States,
individuals must convert income earned in various different currencies
into a single functional currency, typically the U.S. dollar, for tax purposes.71 For example, a taxpayer using dollars as their functional currency but who is paid in a currency such as euros must convert those euros
into dollar equivalents to report the income, which means the identical
salary in euros could be reported as different amounts of income due
solely to the happenstance of the euro/dollar exchange rate fluctuation
70. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(h).
71. I.R.C. § 985; 26 C.F.R. § 1.985-2 (2016); see also Adam Chodorow, Bitcoin and the
Definition of Foreign Currency, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 365, 369–70 (2016).

492

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

over time.72 As a starting point, the simplest way to extend a vertical equity analysis into the international context would be to start with the fewest changes, i.e., treat individuals worldwide as the taxable unit and to
use U.S. dollars as the functional currency under some simplified (even
fixed) exchange rate.
Regardless which unit is chosen, the largest hurdle of expanding vertical equity internationally is the lack of data. For example, worldwide
individual income data is not collected. There is no world tax authority
to do so, and there still is no fully developed mechanism for countries to
share tax data automatically.73 While this presents a challenge, it need
not prove insurmountable. Even in the domestic context, using income
itself is a proxy for utility and ability to pay. Thus, the issue is not whether
income data is available but rather whether any proxy roughly as good as
income in the domestic context would be readily available.
To that end, the World Bank and OECD do publish data on countrylevel income statistics including not only gross domestic profit (GDP) but
also net national income (NNI), as well as GDP per capita and NNI per
capita. Neither metric perfectly matches individual income as a proxy for
vertical equity. In particular, per capita metrics are necessarily mean averages and tell us nothing about distribution of income among individuals. As a starting point, however, these metrics can provide a comparative
metric as between individuals resident in different countries.
As an example, using the most recent World Bank data, the average
income per capita per year in the United States is $47,249; in France
$36,748; in Italy $29,817; in Costa Rica $9,040; and in India $1,803.74
Treating this identically to income for individuals, vertical equity applied
literally would demand that the average U.S. taxpayer pay a significantly
higher marginal tax rate than the average Indian taxpayer to reflect the
significant disparity in income. In effect, the most simplistic version of
vertical equity applied in the international context could effectively demand net transfers of revenue from U.S. taxpayers to Indian taxpayers.
Of course, this analysis leaves out many important factors, such as the
significant disparities in cost of living across the globe; while these issues
are not unique to international tax, they can prove even more daunting to

72. See, e.g., Rodney W. Burton & E. Brownwell Johnston, Jr., The Tax Impact of Changing to
the Euro Under U.S. Tax Law, 24 INT’L TAX J. 1 (1998).
73. See generally About Automatic Exchange, OECD: AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE PORTAL,
https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/about-automatic-exchange/
[https://perma.cc/RT3E-QGKA] (last visited Jan. 9, 2021) (chronicling international efforts to establish the automatic exchange of income information).
74. Adjusted
Net
National
Income
per
Capita,
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.ADJ.NNTY.PC.CD [https://perma.cc/QVE4-SEB8] (last
visited Jan. 11, 2021).
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overcome when applying vertical equity in the international context.75
For example, as of 2018, the cost of living in Hawaii, the highest cost of
living U.S. state, was roughly 30% higher than Mississippi, the lowest
cost of living U.S. state, which means the median household would need
to earn $15,000 more in Hawaii to afford the same cost of living as the
median household in Mississippi.76 By contrast, while an average U.S.
taxpayer earns roughly thirty times more income than an average Indian
taxpayer (in nominal functional currency), that income consumes significantly more in India than it could in the United States.
Fortunately, the World Bank has calculated an additional metric that
attempts to take this disparity into account by converting the unit of measure from a single functional currency into a hypothetical unit called Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). PPP is calculated by measuring income not
in nominal currency but in relation to how much it can consume in its
relevant market.77 Using PPP instead of dollars, the disparity between the
U.S. taxpayer and the Indian taxpayer drops from thirty times to nine
times. While this makes the two taxpayers two-thirds less disparate, vertical equity would still require the U.S. taxpayer to pay a significantly
higher rate than the Indian taxpayer.
Intuitively, this result makes sense. The United States has the largest
economy in the world, at least based on total GDP,78 and (excluding certain small population countries such as Monaco and Macao) has one of
the ten highest GDP per capita.79 By almost any measure, even taxpayers
at the poverty level in the United States have higher average income than
most individuals around the world.80
75. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 439 (1996).
76. See Cost of Living, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS: ECON. RES., https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/cost-of-living/calculator [https://perma.cc/DMY8-XYVW] (last visited Jan.
21, 2021).
77. GNI,
PPP
(Constant
2017
International
$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.PP.KD
[https://perma.cc/3UCT-MHHF]
(last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
78. GDP
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true
[https://perma.cc/8JKA-UWQ7] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (sort the “All Countries and
Economies” chart by “Most Recent Value (Millions)” to see the country with the highest GDP).
79. GDP
Per
Capita
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true
[https://perma.cc/HL9A-E6ZK] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (sort the “All Countries and
Economies” chart by “Most Recent Value (Millions)”).
80. In the United States, the 2020 federal poverty guideline was set at $12,760 for a single
individual. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 85 Fed. Reg. 3,060 (Jan. 17, 2020). Of
the 204 countries the World Bank collects data on, 134 have average per capita incomes of less
than the U.S. federal poverty guideline. Adjusted Net National Income Per Capita (Current US$),
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In terms of an equity analysis, this result may strike many as inappropriate or unfair, at least as an intuitive manner. There has never been
much support in the United States for a policy of significant transfers of
tax revenue to taxpayers in India or Bangladesh or Haiti. Part of the intuition underlying this resistance is based on the fact that part of the reason
for disparities in income around the world has to do with differences in
development, infrastructure, and especially government. For example, it
would be expected that a country governed by a corrupt government
which spends little on improving general welfare of its residents would
have much lower GDP and GDP per capita. Conversely, part of the reason
for high U.S. incomes could be due to a generally stable and effective
government, including stable currency, legal systems, and physical infrastructure. From this perspective, it might seem absurd for vertical equity
to demand transferring revenue from the United States to such a government when the money would be expected to be lost to corruption. Ultimately, the combination of primarily country-level data and the difficulty
of separating individual equity from country-level effects on national income makes the country more appealing as the tax unit for any vertical
equity analysis.
The primary difficulty in using the country as the unit is finding a comparable base to measure utility that could be used as a proxy in the same
manner as income for individuals. Any base tied directly to GDP, NNI,
GDP per capita, or related concepts ultimately suffers the same issues as
discussed above for individuals. In addition, and unique to the country
level, is whether and to what extent country-level metrics should measure
something different than merely an aggregate of the individuals residing
in that country. The key question, therefore, is: What ultimately makes a
country different from an individual? Ultimately, it is the fact that the
country as sovereign and only the sovereign, has the power to impose
taxes. From this perspective, using the sovereign as the relevant unit
means considering not only the total output or income generated within
that country but also looking to both actual tax revenue, potential tax revenue, and public spending funded by tax revenue.
International vertical equity takes these differences into account in the
following ways. First, IVE defines the unit is as the sovereign taxing jurisdictions. Second, it doesn’t look solely to measures of income but instead creates a matrix of measurements unique to the sovereign by looking at a jurisdiction’s tax revenue, public spending, and national income.
It does so by calculating and assigning a novel “IVE Score” which, generally speaking, is intended to represent a country’s public spending as a
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.ADJ.NNTY.PC.CD
[https://perma.cc/8WSZ-4PNK] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
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percentage of its total national income. Putting aside issues surrounding
sovereign debt as an initial matter, the IVE Score reflects the relative
amount a country had to tax itself to pay its bills. The higher the score,
the less national income remains available for the private consumption or
investment. Perhaps more importantly, the higher the IVE Score the less
tax base is available to be taxed, for example in the face of an emergency
such as COVID-19.
Thinking of this in terms of vertical equity for individuals, the IVE
Score could be thought of as a type of marginal tax rate for countries.
Under vertical equity for individuals, the higher the marginal rate the less
is assumed to remain available for personal consumption or investment.
By applying a theory of declining marginal utility of money, vertical equity concludes that taxpayers with higher income are harmed less by paying taxes than taxpayers with lower incomes in terms of overall utility.).
Similarly, vertical equity in the international context could be thought to
conclude that wealthier countries are harmed less by adopting new taxes
so as to raise additional revenue than poorer countries, at least in terms
of overall utility. Translated into IVE Scores, this would mean countries
with lower IVE Scores would be relatively better able to afford to impose
new taxes so as to raise additional revenue than countries with higher IVE
Scores. At the extreme end of the spectrum, a country with an IVE Score
of 1 would have fully taxed its own economy—there simply would be
nothing left to tax if an emergency arose.
In essence, the IVE Score could be thought of as the inverse of income
used as a proxy to assess relative declining marginal utility. For individuals, lower incomes are assumed to match higher marginal utility of
money and higher incomes are assumed to have lower marginal utility of
money. While reasonable people can debate where to draw the line between high and low incomes, the connection to marginal utility has remained mostly without question. For countries, in much the same way,
higher IVE Scores would be assumed to match with higher marginal utility while lower IVE Scores would be assumed to have lower marginal
utility. In other words, countries with low IVE Scores can more easily
afford to raise additional tax revenue with less pain than countries with
high IVE Scores.
C. Translating IVE Scores into IVE Policy
In theory, IVE Scores provide a meaningful metric that can be used as
an effective proxy for utility at the country level and thus translating traditional vertical equity into “international” vertical equity. Unlike vertical
equity, however, where the policy of progressive rates seems a natural
and comfortable fit, policies that further IVE in the international context
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can prove more difficult both to conceive and implement. A direct translation of vertical equity into IVE would require wealthier countries paying more in taxes than less wealthy countries. Translating this into IVE
Scores would mean that wealthier countries should have higher IVE
Scores than poorer countries. Yet, as discussed in more detail below, the
opposite is true.
There are macroeconomic concepts which attempt to measure something similar to the annual income of a country that, while not identical
to the concept of income for an individual, seem to attempt to capture
some similar concepts on a macro level. As discussed above, the most
familiar of these is gross domestic product or GDP. GDP is intended to
be a measure of the gross output of a national economy from domestic
sources so as to measure the ultimate total economic value produced in a
given period. GDP is often used to compare countries in terms of relative
wealth by looking to their total economic output per year, and GDP per
capita is often used to compare countries on a relative basis in terms of
wealth generated per person per year in a given country.
As discussed above, given the parallels between GDP for a country
and income for an individual and the fact that GDP is already used as a
measure of relative wealth and income among countries qua countries, it
follows that it may be useful as well in a tax analysis. From a tax standpoint, however, GDP or similar economic concepts are not sufficient in
and of themselves. The reason is because GDP is not exogenous to tax
policy; countries affect their GDP both by the taxes they impose and the
public spending those taxes finance, such as roads, bridges, electricity,
national defense, and others, as well as through fiscal policy including
tax law.81 Thus, unlike in domestic vertical equity, international tax requires taking into account this additional factor.
For example, the Cayman Islands has an extremely high per capita
GDP, but it is almost entirely due to the fact that it has zero income tax
and thus is used as a location for many international investment funds
such as hedge funds.82 Thus, while on paper the Cayman Islands would
appear to be wealthy in terms of GDP per capita, it more closely resembles a poorer country in terms of tax revenue, public goods, or public
services.

81. Norman Gemmell et al., The Growth Effects of Tax Rates in the OECD, 47 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 1217, 1217 (2014).
82. See, e.g., Michel Brocard & Francois-Serge Lhabitant, A Primer on the Tax Framework of
Offshore and Onshore Hedge Funds, EDHEC BUS. SCH. 1, 19–24 (2016) (discussing the
advantages of locating a hedge fund in the Cayman Islands, including its zero taxation regime, that
has led to over 25% of the world’s hedge funds being located there).
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Unfortunately, at this level of specificity, it becomes difficult if not
impossible to discern any useful generally applicable policy rules sufficient to establish a neutral baseline for equitable analysis outside of a
straight case-by-case basis. To overcome this, a simplifying assumption
becomes necessary. In this case, the key simplifying assumption will be
to look to not only GDP of a country but also NNI. As discussed above,
NNI measures a country’s income generated by productive capacity and
to exclude highly mobile and manipulable forms of income such as financial services.83 In essence, NNI provides insight into the productive capacity of a country’s economy which at least in theory should be less
influenced in the short run by that country’s own tax policy. To this end,
two IVE Scores would be calculated: one representing the country’s total
income tax revenue for a given year over its GDP that year and one over
its NNI for that year. Of course, neither statistic completely excludes the
effect of tax laws on its own economy, but at least for countries with low
rankings in both IVE Scores, using GDP and NNI helps alleviate concerns that results reflect more internal domestic politics rather than a
comparative metric of ability to pay.
Both GDP and NNI statistics are in place and calculated and published
annually by the OECD and the World Bank for reasons unrelated to international tax policy, not only providing a more neutral baseline than
source and residence but also alleviating the administrative concern over
which country should calculate the scores and why other countries should
trust those scores.
Once both IVE Scores are calculated, a picture of relative ability to pay
(meaning at the country level, capacity to raise additional tax revenue)
quickly emerges, at least among countries at the extreme ends of the spectrum. For example, much attention is paid to the U.S. budget deficit and
the total U.S. public debt, in the popular press at least, if for no other
reason than its size.84 Many recent proposals to address the deficit have
come in the form of increasing taxes on multinational corporations or
other international taxpayers.85 This makes sense if the normative framework of the international tax regime was built on inter-nation equity,
83. See Net National Income, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/natincome/net-national-income.htm
[https://perma.cc/44MZ-TU9U] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021) (“Net national income (NNI) is defined
as gross national income minus the depreciation of fixed capital assets (dwellings, buildings,
machinery, transport equipment and physical infrastructure) through wear and tear and
obsolescence.”).
84. See, e.g., Trump’s Most Enduring Legacy Could Be the Historic Rise in the National Debt,
WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/14/trump-legacy-national-debt-increasee/ [https://perma.cc/6KQD-PFB4].
85. See, e.g., David L. Carden, To Pay for the Pandemic, Dry Out the Tax Havens, FOREIGN
POL’Y (July 16, 2020, 12:19 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/16/tax-havens-apple-costs-
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where all of the income of a corporation resident in the United States is
properly considered national gain of the United States. But consider the
question under an IVE analysis: while the U.S. budget deficit is the largest in the world, its tax revenue as a share of its GDP is a tiny fraction
compared to most midsize and small developing countries. What this tells
us is that the United States has greater capacity to increase revenue solely
by taxing its domestic income base, if necessary. In fact, this implicitly is
the reason the United States remains able to borrow effectively at the riskfree rate notwithstanding the size of its national debt. By contrast, countries such as the Netherlands or Luxembourg, which are typically not
thought of as poor or developing in terms of GDP per capita or standard
of living, have an IVE Score significantly higher than the United States,
at times almost double,86 meaning there is significantly less capacity either to tax or borrow.
This disparity in fiscal capacity can been seen in recent events surrounding COVID-19.87 By all accounts, the virus caused a global pandemic requiring worldwide response by every country in terms of testing,
medical care, and research. The virus impacted every country in the world
without regard to national borders. Yet preliminary reports seem to indicate that poorer countries are suffering disproportionately from the pandemic.88 Putting aside different health care networks in different countries, the reason seems to be attributable to fiscal capacity. For example,
while the U.S. economy staggeringly dropped over four percent in the
first quarter of 2020,89 Congress was able to easily pass billions of dollars
pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/J2YC-9H6B]; Tabby Kinder & Emma Agyemang, ‘It’s a Matter of
Fairness’: Squeezing More Tax from Multinationals, FIN. TIMES (July 7, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/40cffe27-4126-43f7-9c0e-a7a24b44b9bc
[https://perma.cc/RKD595KF]; Dominic Rushe, Big Tech and Corporate Tax Cuts: The Targets of Joe Biden's Urgent
Economic
Plans,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
7,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/nov/07/joe-biden-most-urgent-economic-plans-key-elements [https://perma.cc/QTT6T43R].
86. See infra Appendix.
87. See, e.g., The Global Economic Outlook During the COVID-10 Pandemic: A Changed
World, WORLD BANK (June 8, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/08/
the-global-economic-outlook-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-changed-world.
88. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Conquering the Great Divide, INT’L MONETARY FUND: FIN. &
DEV. 17, (Sept. 2020), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2020/09/COVID19-and-globalinequality-joseph-stiglitz.htm [https://perma.cc/TL93-UR7N]; Nicolas Bottan et al., The Unequal
Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic: Evidence from Seventeen Developing Countries, 15 PLOS
ONE 1 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7540865/pdf/pone.0239797.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HZJ-93JN].
89. See Ben Casselman, Worst Economy in a Decade. What’s Next? ‘Worst in Our Lifetime.’,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/business/economy/us-gdp.html
[https://perma.cc/KH22-ENCK] (“U.S. gross domestic product, the broadest measure of goods and
services output, fell at a 4.8 percent annual rate in the first quarter of the year, the Commerce
Department said Wednesday. That is the first decline since 2014, and the worst quarterly
contraction since 2008, when the country was in a deep recession.”).

2021]

International Vertical Equity

499

in stimulus and unemployment benefits90 and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH)
aggressively funded research into a vaccine.91 Even in the face of massive
economic losses, the United States proved to have more than enough fiscal capacity to respond.
Yet few other countries have that luxury. Countries such as Peru and
Guatemala were significantly less able to respond effectively because of
the massive drop in their individual GDP and in worldwide demand for
goods and services.92 These fiscal constraints make responses like continued quarantine, universal testing, and the use of masks and hand sanitizer difficult if not impossible, leading to a vicious cycle.93 Even worse,
they lead to even greater reliance on the shadow or underground economy, which not only is unlikely to pay taxes, but also is unlikely to follow
health regulations, which can lead to even greater spread of the virus.
If instead, however, the United States were to aggressively attempt to
tax some of the income from another country with a higher IVE Score, it
would put increasing pressure on that country to meet its own minimum
government expenses or even threaten that country’s fiscal sovereignty
altogether. Thus, under an IVE standpoint, the comparison for raising the
extra dollar of revenue is between the United States utilizing its own taxing capacity and the United States using the tax capacity of this other
country. Since the United States can afford to pay significantly more of
its national income in taxes than most other countries, vertical equity
analysis would suggest that the United States should tax itself and not the
other country. Taken to an extreme, IVE analysis could suggest transferring tax revenue from the United States to those countries with the highest
IVE Scores.

90. See generally Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub.
L.
116–136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. ch. 116).
91. See Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV.,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/16/fact-sheet-explaining-operation-warpspeed.html [https://perma.cc/TE4V-MPMQ] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (“Operation Warp Speed
(OWS) aims to deliver 300 million doses of a safe, effective vaccine for COVID-19 by January
2021, as part of a broader strategy to accelerate the development, manufacturing, and distribution
of COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics (collectively known as countermeasures).”).
92. See generally Policy Responses to COVID-19, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19
[https://perma.cc/ES97-R2NQ] (last visited Jan. 9, 2021).
93. See, e.g., Elyas Alwazir, World’s Most Vulnerable Countries Lack the Capacity to Respond
to a Global Pandemic, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/
world%E2%80%99s-most-vulnerable-countries-lack-capacity-respond-global-pandemic-creditmfdelyas-alwazir [https://perma.cc/9X7L-LUW7]; Andrew Walker, Developing World Economies
Hit Hard by Coronavirus, BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business52352395 [https://perma.cc/TMD3-Z4D2].
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IVE does not necessarily mandate such extreme measures as revenue
transfers in designing an overall income tax regime, just as vertical equity
does not end up resulting in 100% tax rates for the wealthiest taxpayers
and 0% for everyone else, but a robust conception of vertical equity in
the domestic context does typically result in progressive tax rates. There
is little reason to think the same would not apply in the international context. IVE could prove especially compelling when determining how best
to finance so-called “global public goods” (such as global climate change
or pandemic vaccination) in which all countries benefit.94 With IVE
Scores providing a metric to do so, it could well prove increasingly difficult to oppose doing so in the future.
CONCLUSION
Efficiency considerations have dominated international tax policy
throughout its history. As a result, it should not be surprising that the international tax regime for the most part has focused on issues of protecting the tax base and accompanying revenue of wealthier countries in the
name of defending national gain. This has been true whether the issue has
been so-called income-stripping or tax havens or tax arbitrage or reverse
hybrids or dual residence companies or inversions or Double Irish or
whatever. At some point, if a policy regime consistently and exclusively
reaches the same conclusion no matter what the specific legal issue at
hand, one must question the premise of that regime. For equity to begin
to influence real policy choices in the international tax regime, as it has
in the domestic context, a new and more robust conception of equity and
its role in tax policy is needed. This Essay does just that, introducing International Vertical Equity as that method.

94. See P.B. Anand, Financing the Provision of Global Public Goods, 27 WORLD ECON. 215,
216–17 (2004).
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APPENDIX95
Country

GDP

NNI

Revenue

United
States
Japan

IVE
(G)
20,494,100 16,756,058 1,944,008 9.48

IVE
(N)
11.60

5,414,680

4,326,767

297,387

5.49

6.87

Netherlands

970,604

782,280

96,780

9.97

12.37

Austria

491,095

387,627

47,983

9.77

12.38

Luxembourg
Iceland

67,520

37,401

8,069

11.95

21.57

20,263

14,157

2,521

12.44

17.81

95. All
data
from
National
Accounts
Statistics,
OECD,
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=NAAG [https://perma.cc/98DU-KN6Y] (last
visited Jan. 13, 2021). For 2017 or most recent other year available. All numbers in thousands.

